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ENDURING DOCTRINE:
THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN
WISCONSIN INJURY LAW
When the common law collateral source rule first arose in the area of
tort law over one hundred years ago, only a minority of individuals
maintained health insurance coverage to protect against loss in the event
that a negligent actor injured them. Today, however, the vast majority of
Americans are covered. Because of this change in the landscape of
insurance coverage, many jurisdictions have abrogated or greatly eroded
the collateral source rule under the belief that the rule no longer holds a
justified role in personal injury litigation. Wisconsin, however, continues
to follow the common law form of the rule and recently rejected legislation
that would have effectively abrogated it. Wisconsin is not alone; many
jurisdictions still adhere to the common law collateral source rule, and find
support from many voices in the legal community. This support is
grounded in the belief that the rationales that have long said to justify the
rule still maintain their significance. This Comment agrees with them and
argues that, while the collateral source rule may have its shortcomings, the
many justifications for the common law form of the rule remain crucially
valid today and are significantly overlooked by the suggested alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION

The collateral source rule has long been a fixture in Wisconsin law.1
The rule dictates that “if an injured party receives compensation for [his
or her] injuries from a source independent of the tortfeasor, the payment
should not be deducted from the damages that the tortfeasor must pay.”2
Opponents of the rule have long called for its reform and even its
abrogation—calls that have only grown louder since the passage of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at the federal level in 2010.3
Efforts were recently made in the Wisconsin legislature to abrogate the
rule in personal injury litigation, and while the bill failed, proponents of
the change have vowed to renew these efforts in the next legislative
session.4 This Comment opposes such proposals in the immediate future,
advocating instead for the continued adherence to the common law form
of the collateral source rule in Wisconsin.
For a better understanding of the collateral source rule, consider the
following hypothetical. Imagine you are involved in an automobile
accident, with two different scenarios arising in the aftermath. In scenario
#1, you are a negligent driver who caused the accident. The other driver,
who was of no fault at all, sustained injuries that amount to $100,000 in
medical expenses. Because the injured driver had health insurance
coverage, his or her insurer paid $60,000 of the medical expenses as part
of a negotiated rate of coverage. Still seeking full compensation from you
(the negligent driver), the injured driver sues in search of a money
judgment for the full $100,000 in medical bills accrued over the course of
his or her injury. At trial, the injured driver introduces evidence of the
$100,000 in medical expenses. You wish to introduce evidence that
$60,000 of the plaintiff’s bills were already paid by the plaintiff’s insurer.
The court, however, refuses to admit the evidence, and the jury returns a
judgment against you for $100,000 in damages. You, the defendant, are
upset because in your mind the plaintiff only needed a $40,000 judgment
to be made whole again. Providing the plaintiff with an additional $60,000

1.
2.
3.
4.

Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 26, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1.
Collateral-Source Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See infra Part VI.B.
See infra Part V.C.
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in damages amounts to a double recovery, of sorts, in which the plaintiff
is getting a large sum of money that is entirely undeserved.
In scenario #2, you are now the injured driver in the car accident,
incurring a loss of $100,000 in medical expenses due to the negligence of
another driver. You had the foresight to purchase health insurance, for
which you have paid years’ worth of premiums in order to have the best
coverage available in the market. As a result of possessing this coverage,
your insurer pays $60,000 towards your $100,000 in medical bills. Still
seeking full compensation for your damages, you file suit against the
negligent driver. At trial, you offer into evidence the medical bills making
up the $100,000, but the court also allows the defendant to admit into
evidence how much of those bills were paid by your insurer. The jury,
after noting that you would only need an additional $40,000 to pay the
balance of your medical bills, awards you a judgment of only $40,000.
You are upset because you believe it should be of no concern to the
injured driver nor the jury what arrangements you had the good sense to
make ahead of time to have the payment of your medical bills aided by a
third party. In many ways, you believe you are actually being punished
for your efforts since without this insurance you would have received at
least the additional $60,000. As a policyholder, you paid years’ worth of
premiums in order to be covered, the total of which reaches well into the
thousands of dollars. And now that you actually use this coverage, you
are not seeing all of the benefits that you originally believed you
contracted for when purchasing the policy.
The two scenarios outlined above represent the dichotomy that exists
under the collateral source rule. Scenario #1 portrays the rule in action
in a jurisdiction that follows the traditional, common law form of the rule.
Scenario #2 portrays a jurisdiction that has abrogated the rule completely.
The modern trend, as part of the broader tort reform movement of the
last several decades, is to move away from the collateral source rule5—a
rule that has existed in the United States since the beginning of the
nineteenth century—and follow the latter scenario.6 Wisconsin has
consistently adhered to the rule for roughly one hundred years,7 but the

5. See discussion infra Part V.B.
6. See discussion infra Part II; see also Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1964).
7. See discussion infra Part III.
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recent proposal of legislation seeking to abrogate the rule has cast a
brighter light on the topic in the state than in previous years.8
The collateral source rule is one of crucial significance to tort law,9
specifically in the personal injury context because it relates directly to
each and every individual in society—all of whom are potential plaintiffs,
defendants, and jurors in a civil lawsuit for damages. This Comment
argues that Wisconsin should continue its strong adherence to the
traditional, common law form of the rule, despite calls for reform.
Notwithstanding the rule’s shortcomings and the changing landscapes of
both tort law and the insurance market,10 the primary justifications and
rationales of the collateral source rule remain incredibly viable and
continue to outweigh alternatives seen elsewhere.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of what the collateral
source rule is, its origin in American tort law, and the different forces that
have influenced the rule’s development in state legislatures. Part III
provides a history of Wisconsin’s treatment of the rule and hopes to
provide a thorough update on where the state’s case law currently rests,
specifically as the rule pertains to personal injury litigation. Part IV
examines the core rationales and justifications that helped lead to the
creation of the rule, as well as its maintenance. This part also alludes to
the fact that these rationales seek to contribute to the greater goals of tort
law.
Part V dives into the primary criticisms of the collateral source rule
and modern reforms. Part V also examines the two most commonly
found alternatives to the traditional rule and points out their deficiencies.
This part also explores the recently proposed, yet failed, legislation in
Wisconsin that sought to abrogate the collateral source rule and the
special interests influencing and fueling that proposal.
Part VI argues that the criticisms of the rule, its alternatives, and the
proposed reforms in Wisconsin greatly overlook the rationales that
underlie the collateral source rule. This part concludes that the
alternatives to the rule do little to undermine those rationales and, due to
the buoyancy of those rationales, the collateral source rule must maintain
its current form in Wisconsin law. Part VI also explores what effect, if
any, recent federal healthcare reform may have on the value of the rule
and purports that, once again, any effect that healthcare reform would

8. See discussion infra Part V.C.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
10. See infra notes 140, 145.
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have on the collateral source rule would ultimately fail to erode its total
value.
This Comment, as a whole, does not aim to provide a truly exhaustive
exploration and analysis of the collateral source rule across the country
but instead aims more narrowly to examine the current state of the rule
in Wisconsin, and to help determine what value remains of it for the state.
The Comment ultimately concludes that the collateral source rule
continues to possess immense value for the State of Wisconsin and should
be maintained in its traditional, common law form amid falling into the
crosshairs of special interest groups proposing reform.
II. BACKGROUND
For more than a century, courts throughout the United States have
applied the collateral source rule to affect the amount of money a plaintiff
may receive in a tort action.11 The rule dictates that a plaintiff’s recovery
against a defendant-tortfeasor may not be reduced by any payments or
benefits conferred by sources other than the defendant.12 If a plaintiff
receives compensation for injuries from a third party, the defendant will
nonetheless be liable to the plaintiff for the total cost of the plaintiff’s
medical care.13 “In other words, the tortfeasor is not given credit for
payments or benefits conferred upon the injured person by any person
other than the tortfeasor or someone identified with the tortfeasor (such
as the tortfeasor’s insurance company).”14

11. See Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in the Face of
Tort Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 965,
969 (2012); Larry D. Warren & Nathan L. Mechler, Paid or Incurred and the Collateral Source
Rule Across the Country, 59 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 203, 206 (2009); Unreason in the
Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, supra note 6, at 741.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b, c (AM. LAW INST. 1979). These
payments may be from sources such as insurance policies, employment benefits, gratuities, and
social legislation benefits. Id.
13. Id.
14. Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 26, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1. Generally,
however, where an agreement exists between the plaintiff and their third party collateral source
for subrogation, the collateral source rule does not apply. See Ann S. Levin, Comment, The
Fate of the Collateral Source Rule After Healthcare Reform, 60 UCLA L. REV. 736, 747–48
(2013). Subrogation occurs when an insurance company seeks reimbursement from a
tortfeasor for medical expenses that it paid on behalf of its insured, the plaintiff. Id. “Where
subrogation is allowed, the insurance company can either seek reimbursement from a
tortfeasor directly or assert a right to part of an award that the plaintiff recovers from a
tortfeasor.” Id. It is the contract agreed upon prior to the accident between the insurer and its
insured that provides this right of subrogation to the insurer. Id.
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The collateral source rule is “considered to serve both as a rule of
evidence and as a rule of damages.”15 As a rule of evidence, it bars the
admission of evidence that the plaintiff received benefits from a collateral
source as compensation for any part of the loss.16 As a rule of damages,
a jury is prevented from subtracting from a money judgment any amount
repaid to the plaintiff already from an outside source.17 Accordingly, the
traditional form of the rule has prevented the subtraction of benefits
“received through health insurance, federal medical programs, worker’s
compensation payments, welfare benefits, and even gratuitous benefits”
from a plaintiff’s damage award.18
In an action for personal injuries, the injured plaintiff may seek
damages for the reasonable value of medical care provided.19 As part of
the traditional collateral source rule, the “reasonable value” is the
amount billed for the plaintiff’s medical services and not the lesser
amount ultimately paid by the plaintiff’s health insurance company at a
reduced rate.20 Issues arise today,21 however, due to the now-common
practice of medical providers negotiating with health insurance
companies to provide care to insured individuals at a rate lower than the
billed charge.22 As exemplified in the introduction to this Comment, an
insured plaintiff’s medical bills may amount to $100,000, yet his or her
insurer only pays $60,000 to the medical care provider due to a negotiated
rate.23 The plaintiff may still recover damages for the billed $100,000,
rather than the $60,000 actually paid by his or her insurer. This extra
$40,000 is often referred to as phantom damages since no one ever paid
the medical expenses, or is even obligated to, yet the plaintiff receives the
full price billed by the medical provider.24
A. Special Interest Influence on the Collateral Source Rule
Those most affected by the collateral source rule have played the

15. Warren & Mechler, supra note 11, at 206.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 15, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764.
20. Levin, supra note 14, at 744–45.
21. An example would be phantom damages.
22. Levin, supra note 14, at 744–45.
23. See supra Part I.
24. See Andrew C. Cook, Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules Plaintiffs Entitled to Receive
“Phantom Damages,” FEDERALIST SOC’Y: STATE CT. DOCKET WATCH, Spring 2012, at 1.
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greatest role in shaping its reform or, in turn, maintaining it in its common
law form. The lobbying efforts of groups representing lawyers, doctors,
insurers, businesses, and others have been largely behind any changes to
the rule in the recent decades, often as a segment of the broader tort
reform effort seen in the last half-century.25
The original common law rule with no modification benefits both
plaintiffs and their attorneys because it makes the size of tort awards
larger than in the absence of the rule and, in turn, a larger attorney’s share
under their respective percentage of an award.26 Defense attorneys may
benefit as well because they are likely, for instance, to have substantially
more billable hours when the potential award to the plaintiff is higher.27
The primary lobbying group representing plaintiff attorneys is the
American Association for Justice,28 whose stated mission is, in part, “to
support the work of attorneys in their efforts to ensure that any person
who is injured by the misconduct or negligence of others can obtain
justice in America’s courtrooms, even when taking on the most powerful
interests.”29 Such a position speaks to attorneys seeking the largest
recovery possible for plaintiffs under the traditional, plaintiff-friendly
form of the rule, as opposed to the “powerful interests” further discussed
below who seek to protect likely defendants from such suits.
One of the powerful interests on the other side of the fight are the
insurers of defendants, who benefit from a modified collateral source rule
that precludes recovery under certain circumstances because such
modifications could greatly reduce the size of awards to plaintiffs,
lowering the amount the insurers could be liable for on behalf of the
defendant insured.30 A primary lobbying organization representing
insurers is the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
(NAMIC),31 whose stated goal is the advocacy of insurers’ interests on
key legislative and regulatory initiatives.32 The NAMIC’s official position
25. See generally David Schap & Andrew Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule: Statutory
Reform and Special Interests, 28 CATO J. 83, 92–94 (2008).
26. Id. at 92.
27. Id.
28. See Mission & History, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/who-weare/mission-history [http://perma.cc/ZN3X-6RCN] (last visited Dec. 22, 2014) (previously
known as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 92.
31. See NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES, http://www.namic.org/pac/default.asp
[http://perma.cc/KNV7-KSX2] (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
32. NAMIC Vision & Mission, NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES,
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on collateral source reforms states that it “supports allowing collateral
source payments at trial or offsetting the amount paid to plaintiffs by
collateral sources, less the amount paid by the plaintiff to secure the
benefit.”33 Meaning, the group supports an erosion, and even abrogation,
of the rule.
Additionally, corporations and the business community as a whole, to
the extent that they purchase insurance that protects them in cases of tort
lawsuits brought against them, benefit from erosions to the collateral
source rule as well.34 If insured, a reduction to the rule would likely lower
insurance premiums for these groups as a response to market forces
because plaintiffs’ judgments paid by defendants’ insurers would be
reduced.35 And of course, if the business is uninsured, any judgments
against it in favor of injured plaintiffs would be reduced by any amount
paid by a collateral source on the plaintiff’s behalf.36 Medical care
providers, like the business community, also benefit from erosions to the
rule in that tort awards against them would be lessened, such as doctors,
who are particularly at risk of becoming defendants in a malpractice suit.37
The major organization lobbying on behalf of doctors is the American
Medical Association,38 which calls for federal tort reform in the area of
the collateral source rule by accounting for the “mandatory offset of
collateral sources of plaintiff compensation” in medical liability.39 Both
of these groups—medical care providers and the general business
community—benefit from an eroded collateral source rule as potential
defendants and as insurance premium payers.
Ultimately, the push from these many different sources of influence
for tort reform and the erosion of the collateral source rule culminated in

http://www.namic.org/aboutnamic/visionMission.asp [http://perma.cc/TH7G-BVPS] (last
visited Dec. 22, 2014).
33. Collateral Source Reforms, NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES,
http://www.namic.org/issues/collateralSource.asp [http://perma.cc/D6YA-J2K9] (last visited
Dec. 22, 2014).
34. Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 93.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. In Wisconsin, these medical groups have been successful. See WIS. STAT.
§ 893.55(7) (2013–2014).
38. Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 96.
39. H-435.978 Federal Medical Liability Reform, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/ssl3/ecomm/PolicyFinderForm.pl?site=www.ama-assn.org&uri=/resources/html/
PolicyFinder/policyfiles/HnE/H-435.978.HTM [https://perma.cc/B2BW-VGRC] (last visited
Dec. 22, 2014).
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1986 with the creation of the American Tort Reform Association
(ATRA).40 ATRA’s mission statement brazenly states that it is an
organization set out to fix a justice system that, to paraphrase, has been
compromised by aggressive personal injury lawyers who systematically
recruit clients to target certain defendants as profit centers for massive
suits.41 ATRA’s official position on the collateral source rule—an area in
which the organization devotes significant focus and effort—is to permit
“the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments at trial or
requiring awards to be offset by the amount paid to plaintiffs by collateral
sources, less the amount paid by the plaintiff to secure the benefit.”42
Meaning, the group supports the erosion and even abrogation of the rule.
III. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN WISCONSIN
“The collateral source rule is a well-established rule of law in
Wisconsin.”43 The state has long recognized it,44 and the Supreme Court
40. See Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 96.
41. Mission, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/about/mission
[http://perma.cc/N2PR-Z8S5] (last visited December 22, 2014). The relevant portions of the
ATRA’s mission statement in full reads:
Today, America's $246 billion civil justice system is the most expensive in the
industrialized world. Aggressive personal injury lawyers target certain professions,
industries, and individual companies as profit centers. They systematically recruit
clients who may never have suffered a real illness or injury and use scare tactics,
combined with the promise of awards, to bring these people into massive class action
suits. They effectively tap the media to rally sentiment for multi-million-dollar
punitive damage awards. This leads many companies to settle questionable lawsuits
just to stay out of court. These lawsuits are bad for business; they are also bad for
society. They compromise access to affordable health care, punish consumers by
raising the cost of goods and services, chill innovation, and undermine the notion of
personal responsibility. The personal injury lawyers who benefit from the status quo
use their fees to perpetuate the cycle of lawsuit abuse. They have reinvested millions
of dollars into the political process and in more litigation that acts as a drag on our
economy. Some have compared the political and judicial influence of the personal
injury bar to a fourth branch of government.
Id.
TORT
REFORM
ASS’N,
42. Collateral
Source
Rule
Reform,
AM.
http://www.atra.org/issues/collateral-source-rule-reform [http://perma.cc/9FGM-YX76] (last
visited Dec. 22, 2014).
43. Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 26, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1 (citing
Thoreson v. Milwaukee Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972); Merz v.
Old Republic Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 47, 191 N.W.2d 876 (1971); McLaughlin v. Chi., Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 378, 143 N.W.2d 32 (1966)).
44. Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 39, 116 N.W. 633, 634
(1908).
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of Wisconsin formally adopted it in 1921 in Cunnien v. Superior Iron
Works Co.45 Since then, the court has confirmed its application of the
traditional form of the collateral source rule,46 with Leitinger v. DBart,
Inc. serving today as the state’s clearest endorsement of the rule.47 In
Leitinger, the plaintiff sued for damages from a personal injury, and at
trial the parties argued over the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical
services.48 “The health care provider billed [the plaintiff] $154,818.51 for
the treatment rendered, but as a result of negotiated discounts” between
the provider and insurer, “the health care provider accepted $111,394.73
from [the plaintiff’s] health insurance company.”49
At the circuit court level, “the jury was presented only with evidence
of the amount actually paid for the medical treatment rendered,” ignoring
the collateral source rule.50 The jury awarded the plaintiff $111,394.73 for
his medical expenses—the exact amount that was paid by his insurer.51
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court,
concluding that “the fact finder should not be allowed to consider
‘payments made by outside sources on the plaintiff’s behalf, including
insurance payments.’”52
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on review
was “whether, in light of the collateral source rule, evidence of the
amount actually paid by a plaintiff’s health insurance company for the
plaintiff’s medical treatment is admissible in a personal injury action for
the purpose of establishing the reasonable value of the medical treatment
rendered.”53 The court ultimately held such evidence inadmissible, being
prohibited by the collateral source rule.54
Then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, speaking for a 5–2 majority
of the court, began her analysis by summarizing the collateral source rule
as “help[ing] claimants recover the ‘reasonable value of the medical

45. 175 Wis. 172, 187, 184 N.W. 767, 772 (1921).
46. Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule: Seeking
Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 245 (2009).
47. See Leitinger, 2007 WI 84, ¶ 75.
48. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
49. Id. ¶ 3.
50. Id. ¶ 12.
51. Id. ¶ 13.
52. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Leitinger v. Van Buren Mgmt., Inc., 2006 WI App 146, ¶ 17, 295
Wis. 2d 372, 720 N.W.2d 152).
53. Id. ¶ 4.
54. Id. ¶ 75.
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services, without limitation to the amounts paid.’”55 The court held that
the collateral source rule prohibits parties in a personal injury action from
introducing evidence of the amount actually paid by the injured person’s
health insurance company to prove the reasonable value of the medical
treatment.56
The court agreed with the plaintiff that two Supreme Court of
Wisconsin decisions regarding the collateral source rule governed the
present case: Ellsworth v. Schelbrock57 in 2000 and Koffman v.
Leichtfuss58 in 2001.59 These cases, the court noted, reaffirmed “the
vitality of the collateral source rule” in Wisconsin.60 In Ellsworth, the
court reasoned that Wisconsin’s tort law “applies the collateral source
rule as part of a policy seeking to ‘deter negligent conduct by placing the
full cost of the wrongful conduct on the tortfeasor.’”61 In a further
affirmation of Wisconsin’s adherence to the collateral source rule, the
court held in Koffman that the rule applied to payments that have been
reduced by contractual arrangements between insurers and health care
providers.62 The court reasoned that this “assures that the liability of
similarly situated defendants is not dependent on the relative fortuity of
the manner in which each plaintiff’s medical expenses are financed.”63
Most recently in 2012, the court reaffirmed its adherence to the
doctrine and expanded its reach in Orlowski v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.64 The plaintiff in Orlowski was injured in an
automobile accident caused by an underinsured driver and recovered
damages up to the limits of the underinsured driver’s insurance.65 The
plaintiff also had health insurance coverage that paid a portion of her

55. Id. ¶ 27 (alteration in original) (quoting Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hosp.-Mayo
Health Sys., 2005 WI 124, ¶ 56, 285 Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 201).
56. Id. ¶¶ 28–29.
57. 2000 WI 63, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764. In Ellsworth, the court found that the
collateral source rule applied to medical assistance benefits; thus, the defendant was not
allowed to introduce evidence of the amount actually paid. Instead, the plaintiff could
introduce the amount that was billed by the medical providers. Id. ¶ 2.
58. 2001 WI 111, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201.
59. Leitinger, 2007 WI 84, ¶ 35.
60. Id.
61. Ellsworth, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 7 (quoting Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d
258, 264, 369 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Ct. App. 1985)).
62. Koffman, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 2.
63. Id. ¶ 31.
64. 2012 WI 21, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 775.
65. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
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medical expenses, as well as an automobile insurance policy that included
underinsured motorist coverage.66 After an arbitration panel ruled that
the collateral source rule did not apply to this sort of claim due to a lack
of precedent on the specific issue and after moving through the lower
courts,67 the specific issue before the supreme court was whether the
collateral source rule allows the recovery of written-off medical expenses
in a claim under an insured’s underinsured motorist coverage.68 The court
reaffirmed its prior decisions that “an injured party is entitled to recover
the reasonable value of medical services, which, under the operation of
the collateral source rule, includes written-off medical expenses.”69 The
court held that the distinction between insurance policies for negligence
and underinsured motorist cases did not justify diverging from its
precedent and constraining the collateral source rule’s application.70 This
is the farthest the court has extended the rule to date and reflects the
state’s strong adherence to the rule.
IV. RATIONALES OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Rationales for the collateral source rule that arose from its natural
development, as well as many of the goals underlying the broader area of
tort law, led to the creation of the common law rule and continue to
support it today.71 There are, of course, legitimate criticisms to the rule,72
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts admits there is the possibility of a
double recovery, or any sort of excess damages, to the plaintiff.73 Despite
criticism,74 many tort law experts have long viewed the potential
drawbacks of the rule to be undoubtedly outweighed by its goals and
66. Id.
67. Id. ¶¶ 8–11. At the trial court, the arbitration decision was modified to award the
plaintiff the full value of medical expenses, which included any amounts deducted due to
payments from collateral sources. After the defendant appealed, the court of appeals certified
the case to the supreme court out of concern that the trial court’s decision was in conflict with
the supreme court’s past precedent. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
68. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12.
69. Id. ¶ 4.
70. Id. ¶ 23. Despite the arbitration panel being reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, I must admit that my father, Attorney Paul F. Poehlmann, served on the panel. If it
serves as any consolation to him (which I’m sure it does not), I would have ruled as the
arbitration panel did.
71. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST.
1977).
72. See discussion infra Part V.A.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
74. See infra Part V.A. for more on the rule’s criticisms.
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justifications.75 This Comment will focus on four major rationales of the
collateral source rule: restoration, unjust enrichment, deterrence, and
incentive to mitigate.
A. Restoration of the Plaintiff
Courts often justify the traditional application of the collateral source
rule as providing the most precise form of restoration in the plaintiff,76
meaning the award that will make a plaintiff financially whole again in
light of the injuries suffered.77 When courts are applying the collateral
source rule, it follows that “the injured party should be made whole by
the tortfeasor, not by a combination of compensation from the tortfeasor
and collateral sources.”78 Meaning, those sources are beyond the concern
of the tortfeasor. Additionally, recoverable medical expenses may exist
beyond that of the amount paid by the collateral source, so “[t]he
collateral source rule allows the plaintiff to seek recovery for the
reasonable value of medical services without consideration of payments
made by the plaintiff’s insurer . . . .”79 If a jury is presented with evidence
of exactly what the plaintiff requires to pay off any remaining medical
bills, it will likely award damages of only that amount.80 The damage
award the plaintiff receives from the defendant is often incomplete,
especially when future medical costs and attorney fees are taken into
consideration.81 This reasoning reflects the belief that using the billed
charges, rather than what was actually paid by the collateral source, best
measures the need for making the plaintiff whole again.
B. Unjust Enrichment
Another rationale for the collateral source rule is the law’s desire to
prevent unjust enrichment.82 While one may recognize that its operation
75. Todd, supra note 11, at 977; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt.
b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
76. Levin, supra note 14, at 756.
77. Bozeman v. State, 2003–1016, p. 19 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 704.
78. Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (Va. 2000).
79. Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 29, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1 (quoting
Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 46, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201).
80. Such as in Leitinger, 2007 WI 84, for example.
81. Todd, supra note 11, at 974; see also id. at 977 (“Critics characterize this justification
of the rule as misguided because it seeks to remedy the tort system’s shortcomings through the
oblique and confusing mechanism of the collateral source rule.”).
82. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 485 (2006). “Unjust enrichment” is defined as “The retention of a
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has the potential to provide the plaintiff with a double recovery or
phantom damages,83 advocates of the rule argue that this result is an
acceptable one given the alternative of the defendants receiving such a
windfall themselves.84 The Restatement (Second) of Torts argues:
[I]t is the position of the law that a benefit that is directed to the
injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for
the tortfeasor. If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the
benefit, as by maintaining his own insurance or by making
advantageous employment arrangements, the law allows him to
keep it for himself.85
When a choice must be made between providing a windfall to the
plaintiff or to the defendant, the more culpable defendant should not
receive the benefit of the plaintiff’s foresight.86 Fairness dictates that
“[t]he collateral source rule ensures that the liability of similarly situated
defendants is not dependent on the relative fortuity of the manner in
which each plaintiff’s medical expenses are financed.”87 The purpose of
the rule “is not to provide the injured person with a windfall, but rather
to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping liability because a collateral
source has compensated the injured person.”88 “The injured person, not
the tortfeasor, benefits from the collateral source.”89
C. Incentive to Mitigate
A further justification for the collateral source rule is to provide
incentive for individuals to mitigate their risks by purchasing insurance.90
benefit conferred by another, who offered no compensation, in circumstances where
compensation is reasonably expected.” Unjust Enrichment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014).
83. Cook, supra note 24, at 1.
84. Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis. 2d 726, 733, 512 N.W.2d 749, 752 (1994).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). The
Restatement continues, “If the benefit was a gift to the plaintiff from a third party or established
for him by law, he should not be deprived of the advantage that it confers.” Id. (referring to
gratuitous services or government-funded services).
86. Linda J. Gobis, Note, Lambert v. Wrensch: Another Step Toward Abrogation of the
Collateral Source Rule in Wisconsin, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 857, 862 (1988).
87. Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 32, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1.
88. Id. ¶ 34.
89. Id.
90. See Levin, supra note 14, at 753–54 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the benefit,
as by maintaining his own insurance or by making advantageous employment arrangements,
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Potential increased recovery at trial, as a result of the collateral source
rule, encourages parties to purchase insurance—something public policy
greatly desires.91 Some courts believe that “a person who has invested
years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care should receive the
benefits of his thrift.”92 This investment is premised on a contractual
obligation that insurers have to pay, and they have therefore assumed the
loss as a business risk.93 While the insured plaintiff may not have intended
to bargain for any sort of windfall in the event of an injury, the benefits
that they receive as a result of the injury are simply the result of this
contractual agreement.94 Public policy and the courts have respected this
agreement and reason that the collateral source rule serves as an
incentive for all to enter into such agreements.95
D. Deterrence
A principal goal of the collateral source rule is to deter the harmful
behavior of a tortfeasor, as it is the belief of courts that the greater the
amount of damages levied against a defendant will most discourage that
defendant from negligently harming others in the future.96 Courts are
concerned that “reducing the recovery by the monies paid by a third party
would hamper the deterrent effect of the law.”97 It is asserted that to best
deter a tortfeasor’s negligent conduct, he or she should be fully
responsible for the entire amount of damages billed as a result of his or
her tortious conduct.98
Although the prevalence of insurance coverage is argued to lessen the
deterrent impact of damages,99 there continues to be evidence that tort
the law allows him to keep it for himself.”)).
91. Gobis, supra note 86, at 862.
92. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66 (Cal. 1970).
93. Gobis, supra note 86, at 862.
94. Id.
95. Todd, supra note 11, at 982. As Todd points out, some commentators believe this
rationale of the collateral source rule to be a weak one, generally reasoning that the rule plays
little to no role in an individual’s decision to obtain insurance. Id.; see also Joel K. Jacobsen,
The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. REV. 523, 533–34 n.46 (1991)
(calling the rationale “silly”). Todd goes on to add that the vast majority of scholars and judges
alike view the rationale as a legitimate basis for the collateral source rule. Todd, supra note 11,
at 982.
96. Levin, supra note 14, at 750–51.
97. Bozeman v. State, 2003-1016, p. 13 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 701 (quoting Suhor v.
Lagasse, 2000-1628 p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/13/00); 770 So. 2d 422, 427).
98. See Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 33, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1.
99. See infra Part VI.B. (discussing healthcare reform and its effect on the collateral
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judgments do deter undesirable conduct.100 Advocates of the collateral
source rule argue that the deterrent goal of the rule lies at the heart of the
fault basis of tort law and to overlook this goal would encourage
undesirable conduct.101 It is further argued that if the collateral source
rule were abrogated, the tort system would be deprived of the
opportunity to correct the wrongdoer and deter further injurious conduct
of the individual tortfeasor and others participating in tortious activity.102
This rationale for the rule lies at the core of tort law and remains an
indispensable justification regardless of whether a tortfeasor is actually
aware of the collateral source rule.
V. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN THE AGE OF TORT REFORM
The common law collateral source rule originated at a time when
health insurance and public health benefits did not exist,103 and recent
changes in the way health care is provided and paid for has led many
states to review the fairness and necessity of the rule.104 Such review, in
conjunction with the rule’s general criticisms, has led a number of states
to modify or abrogate the rule in attempts to account for today’s
economic realities.105
A. Criticisms of the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule’s treatment of damages has been heavily
criticized for having the potential to create a windfall for plaintiffs.106 This
is due, in large part, to the fact that because the jury would be unaware of
any collateral payments, it might award medical damages that are higher
than the amount the plaintiff or the collateral source actually paid for the

source rule (CSR)).
100. L. Timothy Perrin, Comment, The Collateral Source Rule in Texas: Its Impending
Demise and a Proposed Modification, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 961, 989 (1987).
101. Id. at 989–90.
102. Lawrence P. Wilkins, A Multi-Perspective Critique of Indiana’s Legislative
Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule, 20 IND. L. REV. 399, 402–03 (1987).
103. Benjet, supra note 46, at 211.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally Unreason in the Law of Damages: the Collateral Source Rule, supra
note 6 (constituting one of the earliest calls for reform and erosion of the rule, primarily
attacking the core rationales of the rule as insufficient); see also Jacobsen, supra note 95, at 523
(criticizing the rule for neglecting the role of the jury in tort cases in which the collateral source
rule is invoked).
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medical care (phantom damages).107 Additionally, opponents argue that
the rule allows for the possibility that a tortfeasor may pay a judgment
even though the plaintiff has already been partly or completely
compensated for the injuries suffered.108 “Thus, double recovery is
possible[,] and the plaintiff can be put in a better position than before the
tort occurred.”109
The potential for excessive damage awards brings about the criticism
that the collateral source rule conflicts with the compensatory role of tort
law.110 A primary purpose of tort law is to make plaintiffs whole again
after an accident occurs or to put plaintiffs in the same condition as before
an accident.111 “The collateral source rule, however, requires a
[tortfeasor] to pay even though plaintiffs have already been
compensated.”112 Recovering under such circumstances is more alike to
punitive damages, and punitive damages do not compensate but rather
punish to discourage other similar offenses.113
A third criticism of the collateral source rule is that it conflicts with
the damage mitigation principle of tort law.114 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts, in describing mitigation, provides:
When the defendant’s tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to
the extent that this is equitable.115
Under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff may receive a benefit as
a result of the tortfeasor’s conduct, while not having their judgment
reduced by this same benefit.116 “Therefore, the rule contravenes the

107. Levin, supra note 14, at 744.
108. Gobis, supra note 86, at 860 (when subrogation rights do not exist for the collateral
source).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2, 7 (5th
ed. 1984).
112. Joseph M. Engl, Comment, Gratuitous Nursing Services Rendered by Extended
Family Members and Other Third Parties: Can Injured Parties Receive Reimbursement Under
Wisconsin’s Collateral Source Rule?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 1003, 1008–09 (2002).
113. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 9.
114. Gobis, supra note 86, at 861.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
116. Gobis, supra note 86, at 861.
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mitigation principle because receipt of benefits from a collateral source
does not act to mitigate damages.”117
A majority of the criticism surrounding the rule focuses on the
damages awarded to plaintiffs but overlooks the effect of the rule on the
fact finder.118 As previously stated,119 the rule withholds certain
information relevant to the calculation of the plaintiff’s damages.120
Withholding information such as the actual amount paid for medical
expenses diminishes the jury’s traditional role of deciding all contested
issues of fact, including damages.121 Traditionally, the jury has been
viewed as having adequate discretion for handling the assessment of
damages.122 It is argued that “the collateral source rule significantly limits
the exercise of this discretion by withholding relevant information from
the jury.”123 Although the jury may overcompensate the victim, it does so
unwittingly.124
In Wisconsin, justices of the supreme court have raised much of these
criticisms in dissent of decisions that either upheld or expanded the reach
of the rule. In 2000 and 2001, then-Justice Diane Sykes dissented in two
cases125 that the correct reward of medical damages is what is truly
incurred by the plaintiff in the treatment of his or her injuries, “not an
artificial, higher amount based upon what the plaintiff might have
incurred if he or she had a different sort of health plan or no health plan
at all.”126 Less than a decade later, then-Justice Patience Roggensack
wrote a lengthy dissent in Leitinger v. DBart, arguing that the court
extended the collateral source rule too far when it ruled that parties are
prohibited in personal injury actions from introducing evidence of the
amount actually paid by the person’s health insurer.127 She argued that
the majority had unnecessarily expanded the evidentiary component of

117. Id.
118. For a more thorough analysis of this criticism, see Jacobsen, supra note 95.
119. See supra Part II.
120. See Warren & Mechler, supra note 11, at 206.
121. See generally Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 1976).
122. Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 725 F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984).
123. Jacobsen, supra note 95, at 524–25.
124. Id. at 525.
125. See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 67, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201;
Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 23, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764.
126. Koffman, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 69; see also Ellsworth, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 31.
127. Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶¶ 77–78, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1
(Roggensack, J., dissenting).
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the collateral source rule, creating a new category of damages and
usurping the jury’s fact-finding function.128
B. Alternatives to the Common Law Collateral Source Rule
Statutes reforming the collateral source rule vary widely,129 but nearly
all possess the goal of eliminating the potential for excessive recovery by
the plaintiff.130 Throughout the United States, forty-two jurisdictions
have enacted some form of legislation that restricts the rule.131 Within
these jurisdictions, “[e]ven where the rule has been applied generally,
collateral source damages are often limited in health care liability cases
as part of broader tort-reform legislation.”132 States that have diverged
from the common law approach to the rule pay more attention to
payments by the plaintiff’s health insurer, whether the same insurance
plan calls for subrogation, and whether the plaintiff paid premiums to
contract for the benefits he or she received at the time of the injury.133
The overall result of the divergence from the common law rule across the
country has, in general, led to two alternative approaches for measuring
personal injury damages accurately.134
One option is to subtract from charged medical bills the amount that
the plaintiff’s insurer has paid (or another collateral source), including
amounts written off.135 This has the result of abrogating the collateral
source rule entirely, viewing medical expenses already paid or discounted
by collateral sources as not constituting harm suffered by the plaintiff,
and therefore would not be included in any damage calculation used to
make the plaintiff whole again.136 Florida, for example, has a statute
under which a court must reduce an award of economic damages by “all
amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which
are otherwise available to the claimant, from all collateral sources.”137
128. Id.
129. Benjet, supra note 46, at 211.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Levin, supra note 14, at 756.
134. Id. at 757.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2014). Other states abrogating, or significantly
eroding, the collateral source rule include: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 12-21-45 (LexisNexis
2014)) (allowing evidence of medical or hospital expenses that have been or will be paid or
reimbursed); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.070 (2014)) (allowing for a post-verdict reduction
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States that have taken this first approach and effectively abrogated
the rule reason that payments from a collateral source adequately restore
a victim to whole.138 Some state supreme courts, however, have actually
found their state’s statutes completely abrogating the rule in this general
manner as improper under their state constitutions.139 For example, in
New Hampshire the state’s attempt at abrogating the rule was held to
discriminate arbitrarily in favor of health care providers as a class, thereby
violating equal protection guarantees of the New Hampshire
Constitution.140 Additionally, a shortcoming to this approach is that it
completely overlooks the cost and effort exerted by a plaintiff in
obtaining the collateral source payment.141 If the collateral source was
something like an insurance provider, for which the plaintiff had to pay
premiums for a length of time, then a damage award reflecting only the
medical expenses paid would result in a plaintiff not truly have been made
whole. Thus, if insurance premiums were considered necessary to make
the plaintiff whole, the collateral source rule would compensate a plaintiff
more adequately than this alternative option.
A somewhat softer alternative than total abrogation of the collateral
source rule is to allow damage awards to be reduced by payments made
by collateral sources but then to offset that reduction by the amount the
plaintiff paid in something such as insurance premiums.142 While this
by amounts received or to be received from collateral sources that do not have subrogation
rights); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2014)) (abrogating the collateral source
rule in medical malpractice suits but retaining the common law rule in all other contexts); Idaho
(IDAHO CODE § 6-1606 (2014)) (prevents double recovery due to collateral source payments
but only when those collateral sources are not those for which the plaintiff contracted for);
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906(2) (2015)) (abrogating the collateral source rule in
medical malpractice suits, but retaining the common law rule in all other contexts); Maryland
(MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09(d) (West 2014)) (abrogating the collateral
source rule in medical malpractice suits but retaining the common law rule in all other
contexts); New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4545 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)) (partially abolishes
the collateral source rule); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2013)) (eliminates
the collateral source rule only to the extent that it prevents double recovery for payments from
sources such as Social Security benefits); Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 41.0105
(West 2014)) (abrogating the collateral source rule).
138. See Benjet, supra note 46, at 211.
139. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); see also O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth,
892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995).
140. Carson, 424 A.2d at 836.
141. Levin, supra note 14, at 758.
142. Id. Other states follow some form of this approach. See, e.g., Connecticut (CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a)–(b) (West 2015)) (reducing damages awards by collateral
source payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount of premiums paid as
of the date the court enters judgment); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (LexisNexis
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approach would still abrogate the rule and be unwelcomed by plaintiffs,143
it would still provide an additional recovery for premium payments and
shows greater respect for the plaintiff’s efforts in securing insurance
coverage144—something tort law always seeks to encourage.145
One problem with this middle-ground approach is how to calculate
the amount of premium payments a plaintiff should receive as part of his
or her overall damage award146—a problem responded to inconsistently
across the states following it.147 Minnesota resolves this issue by
accounting for the premiums paid in the two years before the lawsuit,148
while Connecticut calculates the amount the plaintiff paid in premiums
during the years in which the plaintiff received care related to the
injury.149 In either alternative to the common law rule, plaintiffs that have
the foresight to obtain something like insurance coverage are still much
worse off and defendants better off.
C. Proposed Legislation in Wisconsin
In early 2013, the Wisconsin Assembly and Senate introduced mirror
bills aimed at reforming the Wisconsin law governing collateral source
payments in personal injury cases.150 The proposed change would have
2014)) (allowing into evidence proof of collateral source payments, proof of subrogation
obligations, and proof of the cost of securing the collateral benefits; such consideration is not
automatic, however, and must be introduced into evidence); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.6303 (West 2014)) (reducing damages awards by collateral source payments if no
subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount of premiums paid); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 548.251 (West 2015)) (reducing damages awards by collateral sources payments if no
subrogation exists but offsetting it by amount of premiums paid in the two-year period before
the lawsuit); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2015)) (reducing damages awards over
$50,000 by collateral source payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount
of premiums paid in the five years preceding the judgment should such evidence be admitted);
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2014)) (reducing damages awards post-judgment by
collateral source payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount of premiums
paid); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2015)) (reducing damages awards by
collateral sources payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by amount of premiums
paid during the policy period which the benefits are payable); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.20 (LexisNexis 2014)) (reducing damages awards by collateral sources payments if no
subrogation exists but offsetting it by amount of premiums paid).
143. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 128 (N.D. 1978).
144. Levin, supra note 14, at 758.
145. See supra notes 25–29.
146. Levin, supra note 14, at 759.
147. Id.
148. MINN. STAT ANN. § 548.251 (West 2015).
149. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 52–225a(c) (West 2015).
150. See Assemb. B. 29, 101st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013); S.B. 22, 101st Leg. Reg. Sess.
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allowed the fact finder to consider evidence of collateral source payments
and evidence of the injured person’s obligations of subrogation or
reimbursement resulting from those collateral source payments.151 This
change had the “purpose of rebutting the presumption that billing
statements and invoices that are patient health care records state the
reasonable value of the health care services provided to the injured
person.”152 The legislation failed to advance out of a Senate Joint
Resolution in April of 2013,153 but similar legislation is likely to reappear
in 2015–2016 session.154
According to Wisconsin’s Government Accountability Board, the
groups that lobbied in support of the legislation to reform the collateral
source rule, as well as those that opposed it, made the Assembly Bill the
ninth-most-lobbied bill in the first six months of 2013.155 Some of the
lobbying groups that acted in support of the legislation included the
Wisconsin Defense Counsel,156 which advocates on behalf of defendants
in civil litigation matters,157 as well as the Wisconsin Medical Society,158 a
group advocating for physicians and medical care providers.159
A primary opponent of the legislation was the Wisconsin Association
for Justice, the state’s chapter of the national American Association for
Justice.160 A press release by the organization released just after the
(Wis. 2013).
151. See Assemb. B. 29; S.B. 22.
152. S.B. 22 (emphasis added); see also Assemb. B. 29.
153. WCJC Legislative Tracking Report 2013–2014, WIS. CIV. JUST. COUNCIL, INC.,
http://www.wisciviljusticecouncil.org/tracking-report/
[http://perma.cc/X7JA-52N9]
(last
updated Mar. 26, 2014).
154. See Andrew Cook, Wisconsin Legislative Update, 12 WIS. CIV. TRIAL. J. 6 (2014).
After personal inquiry, the relevant State Senate and Assembly committees’ report that, as of
July 1, 2015, no such legislation has been discussed in the current session.
155. G.A.B. Releases Detailed Lobbying Report for First Six Months of 2013, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD: STATE OF WIS. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://gab.wi.gov/node/2946
[http://perma.cc/TU3C-7GWL].
156. Cook, supra note 154, at 6. The WDC was previously known as the Civil Trial
Counsel of Wisconsin. Id.
157. About the Wisconsin Defense Counsel, WIS. DEF. COUNS., http://www.wdconline.org/about-wdc/ [http://perma.cc/2HRC-9NEB (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).
MED.
SOC’Y,
158. Lobbying
Tracker,
WIS.
https://www.wisconsinmedicalsociety.org/policies/assembly-bill-29/
[http://perma.cc/F7LF3ADP] (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
159. About Us, WIS. MED. SOC’Y, https://www.wisconsinmedicalsociety.org/ about-us/
[https://perma.cc/W9SP-AUMA] (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
160. Press Release, Wisconsin Association for Justice, New Legislation Encourages
Premium Theft (Feb. 15, 2013), https://www.wisjustice.org/docDownload/439771
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introduction of the legislation denounced the bill for discriminating
“against responsible Wisconsinites who have planned ahead and
purchased health insurance. By allowing in evidence of amounts paid by
someone else, people with health insurance could recover less money for
their medical care than people without insurance. That is wrong.”161 The
release went on to conclude that the bill actually “penalizes people who
have worked hard and bought health insurance,” stressing that “[t]he bill
rewards bad behavior and encourages premium theft.”162
Despite the failed legislative effort of 2013, the fight over reforming,
maintaining, or abrogating the collateral source rule in Wisconsin tort law
is unlikely to be finished. There is significant discussion from groups that
lobbied for the legislation that efforts be renewed beginning in the 2015–
2016 legislative session.163 Those opposed to any erosion of the collateral
source rule will likely be ready to renew their strong support for the
common law rule and continue to argue for its preservation.164
VI. THE CASE AGAINST REFORMING THE COLLATERAL SOURCE
RULE IN WISCONSIN
Wisconsin tort law should refrain from making any significant erosion
to the collateral source rule as it applies in the personal injury context in
the immediate future. The alternatives to the common law collateral
source rule outlined earlier in this Comment,165 including the proposed
legislation in Wisconsin,166 fly in the face of tort law’s many goals. While
these alternatives may lessen the risk of providing double recovery or
phantom damages to the plaintiff, they ignore many of the core rationales
and justifications for the rule that continue to require its existence.
A. Overlooked Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule
Eliminating the collateral source rule would likely result in the
inequitable benefit of defendants.167 The alternatives not only fail to
[https://perma.cc/PP7C-MQRM].
161. Id. (quoting then-President Attorney Jeff Pitman).
162. Id.
163. See generally Cook, supra note 154, at 6. The Wisconsin Defense Council, for one,
wrote in the spring of 2014 that the “WDC will continue to work on the collateral source
legislation in 2015–2016 . . . .” Id.
164. See generally Todd, supra note 11, at 973–74.
165. See supra Part V.B.
166. See supra Part V.C.
167. See Hubbard, supra note 82, at 485.
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prevent a defendant from receiving a windfall, they actually encourage
such a result. By allowing the consideration of collateral source payments
on behalf of the plaintiff, a defendant would consistently be given a
significant break in any judgment made against him or her when a
collateral source payment occurred. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reasoned in Leitinger v. DBart, the tortfeasor should not be given a credit
for benefits conferred upon the victim simply because that person had the
foresight to make wise arrangements, such as maintaining insurance.168
Tort law has long reasoned that a benefit directed to the injured party
should not become a windfall for the wrongdoer instead respecting the
strategic and positive planning of the injured party.169
This benefit, arising out of the efforts of a plaintiff, should be
protected by contract law as well. The plaintiff deserves to reap the
benefit of his or her bargain by contracting with his or her insurance
company, or whatever other outlet the plaintiff received collateral
support from.170 “Allowing a tortfeasor to benefit from an injured party’s
[bargain] contravenes the contract principles of promoting the parties’
intent and limiting third-party beneficiary rights.”171 In many ways an
insured plaintiff is actually punished for having this foresight, as
previously suggested.172
Opponents of the collateral source rule often disregard the argument
that it would result in unjust enrichment in defendants instead contending
that potential overcompensation of a plaintiff goes against the corrective
notions of tort law.173 These corrective notions of tort law advocate that
damages are supposed “to return the plaintiff as closely as possible to his
or her condition before the accident.”174 Tort law is frequently
inconsistent on this goal, however, as exemplified by the three different
types of damages that often make up judgments: economic, noneconomic,
and punitive.175 While economic damages relate directly to the stated

168. 2007 WI 84, ¶ 28, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
170. Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule and Its
Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 62–65 (2005).
171. Todd, supra note 11, at 975. Here the tortfeasor.
172. See Press Release, supra note 160.
173. Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 170, at 57; see also supra, Part IV.A on restoration
as a goal of tort law and rationale for the traditional collateral source rule.
174. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 679
(7th ed. 2001).
175. Todd, supra note 11, at 972.

2015]

ENDURING DOCTRINE

233

“make-whole” goal of tort law, many experts argue that noneconomic
damages (such as pain and suffering) do not relate to this goal, due in
large part to their imprecision and airy nature.176 Additionally, punitive
damages, which are intended for deterrence and retribution, are
unrelated to any goal of making the plaintiff whole again.177 The
possibility of overcompensating a plaintiff through the collateral source
rule is no more inconsistent with the make-whole doctrine of tort law than
awarding that same plaintiff noneconomic and punitive damages.178
The collateral source rule, in fact, is perfectly consistent with the
concepts of deterrence, retribution, and economic efficiency. Ensuring
that defendants pay the full measure of damages for tortious behavior is
advanced by the rule, and any abrogation of it could very well result in
under-deterrence from engaging in the tortious behavior.179 If a plaintiff’s
insurer provided payments toward medical expenses, the plaintiff’s
insurance would essentially serve as a subsidy for the defendant’s tortious
behavior.180 The relationship between law and economics makes plain the
concept that if a tortfeasor is not liable for the damages he or she causes,
he or she will over-engage in that activity. In fact, states with diluted
versions of the rule have been correlated to increased vehicular deaths,
as drivers may exhibit a slightly lower degree of care when they face less
than the full costs of the accidents they cause, and an increase in infant
mortality, as physicians may be exercising less care when liability for
malpractice costs is reduced.181 Full compensation deters not only the
injury-causing behavior by increasing the costs of it but also helps

176. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation into “Punishment”, 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 60 (2002); Martin V.
Totaro, Note, Modernizing the Critique of Per Diem Pain and Suffering Damages, 92 VA. L.
REV. 289, 310 (2006).
177. Avihay Dorfman, What is the Point of the Tort Remedy?, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 105, 142
(2010).
178. Todd, supra note 11, at 972–73.
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977);
Levin, supra note 14, at 750–51.
180. Todd, supra note 11, at 973.
181. Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 86. However, this is less meaningful in Wisconsin
due to WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2013–2014), which heavily shields medical care providers from
medical malpractice actions by making it much harder procedurally on plaintiffs to bring suits.
By presenting the second statistic from the Schap and Feeley article, I do not intend to accuse
doctors of intentionally caring less in such situations but simply present the statistical
connection between mortality rates and potential negligence.
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individuals realize the “optimal scale of activity” that balances risk-taking
activity with its true cost.182
Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit argues in favor of the collateral source rule out of
overall efficiency.183 Judge Posner provides a helpful account for why law
and economics ultimately favor the common law rule due to efficiency:
If an accident insurance policy entitles me to receive $10,000 for a
certain kind of accidental injury and I sustain that injury in an
accident in which the injurer is negligent, I can both claim the
$10,000 from the insurance company and obtain full damages
(which, let us assume, are $10,000) from the injurer, provided I did
not agree to assign my tort rights to the insurer (subrogation). To
permit the defendant to set up my insurance policy as a bar to the
action would result in under-deterrence. The economic cost of the
accident, however defrayed, is $10,000, and if the judgment against
him is zero, his incentive to spend up to $10,000 (discounted by
the probability of occurrence) to prevent a similar accident in the
future will be reduced. Less obviously, the double recovery is not
a windfall to me. I bought the insurance policy at a price
presumably equal to the expected cost of my injury plus the cost
of writing the policy. The company could if it wished have
expected from coverage accidents in which the injurer was liable
to me for the cost of the injury, or it could have required me to
assign to it any legal rights that I might have arising from an
accident.184
A balancing of the economic factors described above—a lack of
under-deterrence in the tortfeasor and an injured party’s investment in
insurance—reflect the practicality behind maintaining the rule, the sense
in which these justifications have not weakened amid a changing
society.185 The common law collateral source rule remains a crucial rule
of both tort and evidence law and remains a necessary doctrine in order
to best promote the goals of Wisconsin law. The rationales that underlie
the rule, as well as the economic reasoning that supports it, continue to
outweigh any of its shortcomings. It is because of these rationales and
182. Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern Theories of
Tort Law and a Proposal for Practical Application, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075, 1085 (1997).
“Optimal scale of activity” can be described as meaning the balance of the marginal social cost
and marginal social benefit. Keith N. Hylton, A Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1507 (2006).
183. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 200–04 (6th ed. 2003).
184. Id. at 200.
185. See discussion supra notes 183–84.
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economic incentives that support Wisconsin adherence to its traditional,
common law form and ignore any calls for its erosion or abrogation.
B. Effect of Health Care Reform on the Collateral Source Rule
Much has been written in recent years on the potential effect that
recent healthcare reform may have on the future landscape of tort
recovery and the collateral source rule. Passage at the federal level of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010186 followed
on the heels of legislative reforms in states such as Massachusetts, Hawaii,
Maine, and Washington, with each policy imposing similar mechanisms
aiming to provide healthcare coverage to all residents.187 Stated very
generally, the ACA serves to provide all Americans with health insurance
in two major ways. First, by forcing the expansion of employer-based
policies, as employers are compelled under the law to offer health
insurance plans to individuals working full-time hours for companies
employing fifty or more individuals.188 Second, the ACA next attempts
to provide universal health care through a mandate that all individuals
possess insurance coverage.189 Aside from certain exceptions, should an
individual fail to obtain health insurance he or she will be subjected to a
financial penalty.190
Many believe these initiatives and reforms have the potential to
completely undermine the core rationales of the collateral source rule—
mainly due to the fact that the rule originated at a time when few to no
plaintiffs had health insurance,191 and these reforms rely on the ambitious
goal of all potential plaintiffs being insured.192 One rationale of the rule
that could be undermined is the incentive that it gives individuals to
purchase insurance and the rewarding of a plaintiff’s foresight for doing
so.193 Those supporting the position that healthcare reform undermines
186. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
§§ 1501–11 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. V 2011)) [hereinafter Affordable Care
Act].
187. See Roger Stark, What Works and What Doesn’t: A Review of Health Care Reform
in the States, WASH. POL’Y CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE 2–3 (Aug. 2008),
https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/sites/default/files/StateHealthCareReforms.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UJY8-BLUV].
188. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012).
189. See Affordable Care Act, §§ 1501–11.
190. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (2012).
191. See Levin, supra note 14, at 742.
192. See Affordable Care Act, §§ 1501–11.
193. See Todd, supra note 11, at 982.
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the justifications of the rule would likely argue that because of the
individual mandate in the ACA, the government provides the incentive
to purchase insurance by imposing a financial penalty on individuals who
fail to do so.194 Additionally, if the government compels every potential
plaintiff to purchase health insurance or forces his or her employer to
provide it, it may be argued that no reward for any foresight would be in
order.
Despite these arguments, the rationales of incentive and rewarding
foresight still serve as adequate support to the collateral source rule in the
face of healthcare reform. The individual mandate requiring health
insurance has a significant gap because Americans still have the
individual choice of not purchasing health insurance and facing a
relatively small penalty.195 It is far from known today just how successful
the reform will actually be at reaching its ultimate goal of having all
Americans covered with health insurance. The more Americans that
choose to face the penalty in lieu of coverage, the more justified
maintenance of the common law collateral source rule would be.
Additionally, there are several other concerns that remain to be settled
in regard to the ACA, such as how much job loss, if any, will result from
the employer mandate due to employers seeking to avoid employing fifty
full-time workers, thus sidestepping the ACA’s requirement of employers
with fifty or more full-time workers to provide insurance to workers and
leaving individuals to again face the choice of either obtaining coverage
or facing the penalty.196
The ACA and other reforms also fail to undermine the support to the
collateral source rule that favors rewarding the contract-relationship
between the insured and his or her insurer. Opponents of the rule reason
that because health insurance will be compulsory, the relationship

194. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2012).
195. STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW
HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 89 (2010) (“The relatively small
penalty and the prospect of loose enforcement create a big potential problem: If many younger
and healthier people decide to pay the fine instead of buying coverage, rates will increase for
those who do buy it.”).
196. Glenn Kessler, Is Obamacare a ‘job killer’?, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/02/26/is-obamacare-a-job-killer/
[http://perma.cc/EM56-PZ27] (concluding that the jury is still out on the overall effect that the
looming employer-mandate will have on job loss, as well as the effect it has already had as
employers prepare for the 2015 and 2016 impositions of the policy, depending on the size of the
employer).
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between the parties takes on far less meaning.197 However, even if the
healthcare reforms are hugely successful, this theory ultimately fails
because it ignores an important aspect of this new healthcare landscape:
Individuals are still able to contract for the best possible coverage or plan
for themselves.198 Such effort on the part of the individual to find him or
herself the best coverage available can still be rewarded under the
collateral source rule, even in light of healthcare reform, as one form of
insurance bargained for can certainly provide greater financial outcomes
for a plaintiff, be it through actual coverage, lower premium payments, or
some other result.
Finally, the deterrence rationale remains a major justification of the
collateral source rule because the ACA makes little effort to deter
negligent behavior on behalf of tortfeasors.199 Eroding the collateral
source rule reduces the defendant’s liability and allows the defendant to
escape the full cost of harming a victim. If everyone is insured and the
collateral source rule is abrogated to allow only for the amount of medical
expenses actually paid, tortfeasors would not be deterred in the slightest
from any risk-taking behavior. Ultimately, recent healthcare reform will
do little to undermine the most significant rationales of the common law
collateral source rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
After exploring the collateral source rule—its role, common
criticisms, core rationales, the available alternatives, and Wisconsin’s own
treatment of it—this Comment concludes Wisconsin was right in rejecting
the 2013 bill and should reject any similar legislation that is again
proposed in the coming session to ensure that the state maintain its
adherence to the common law form of the rule. While the primary
criticisms about the shortcomings of the rule are valid, these negatives
pale in comparison to the strong rationales that continue to firmly support
the rule today. The rationales of restoration, unjust enrichment,
mitigation, and deterrence help to advance the greater goals of tort law
while at the same time rewarding a plaintiff’s foresight in seeking out a
collateral source and respecting his or her right to contract.
An argument often put forth by the rule’s opponents is that because
the rule came about during a time when most of the population lacked
197. Todd, supra note 11, at 983.
198. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2012). The ACA does not preclude such contracting.
199. Todd, supra note 11, at 986.
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health insurance coverage, the rule is no longer necessary because a
majority of the country now has health insurance, as well as recent
healthcare reform.200 Because recent healthcare reform has the goal of
universal coverage of all Americans, it is argued that the many rationales
of the common law collateral source rule are now undermined.201 The
changes in the healthcare landscape, however, greatly overlook the
rationales that underlie the rule and fail to accept the reality that the
changes in the healthcare market do little to degrade those rationales.
They remain intact and will continue to advance the goals of tort law
should the traditional form of the collateral source rule endure any efforts
at tort reform in Wisconsin.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has consistently adhered to the
common law rule, doing so throughout many different decades and with
many different compositions of justices on the court. Throughout this
entire time, the court and the state legislature have not been ignorant to
the reforms to the collateral source rule that other jurisdictions across the
country have enacted. Wisconsin’s government has instead rejected any
such change, ultimately believing that adhering to a strong form of the
rule is what is best for the state and its citizens. Such a position on the
issue must resist any change in the future because, by doing so, the goals
of Wisconsin law will continue to be advanced. In order to best protect
injured plaintiffs, their rights, and the many goals of the law, Wisconsin
should continue its adherence to the common law collateral source rule.
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